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ABSTRACT
The winter of 1917–1918 was a difficult time for the men and officers of 
the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps [C.E.P.]. Its two divisions were now 
fighting side by side in Flanders, but were no longer receiving regular 
reinforcements from Portugal, where a coup d’état had replaced the 
committed interventionist leadership of Afonso Costa and Norton de 
Matos with Sidónio Pais’ ‘New Republic’, which prioritized domestic 
concerns. Despite this change and an ensuing Anglo-Portuguese 
agreement to lessen the C.E.P.’s front, allowing only one division to 
remain in the trenches, the Portuguese corps in its entirety remained 
in situ until early April 1918 when, in the face of a looming German 
offensive, it began to be withdrawn. Serious questions remain 
regarding the timing of this withdrawal and its link to the Battle of 
the Lys, on 9 April, which saw the Portuguese Second Division wiped 
out in the course of a single morning’s fighting.
In the first part of this article, we considered the evolution of British–Portuguese rela-
tions in France during the First World War, focusing on the puzzling decision to allow the 
Portuguese Expeditionary Corps [Corpo Expedicionário Português, C.E.P.] to become a full 
army corps in November 1917, shortly after steps were taken that made its reinforcement 
almost impossible. The stretch of trenches assigned to the Portuguese in Flanders could not 
but, over time, become increasingly lightly defended. Part II of this article continues the 
examination of Anglo-Portuguese military relations until 9 April 1918, when what remained 
of the C.E.P. in the front lines – mostly its Second Division, reinforced by elements of the 
first and supported by the corps’ artillery – was wiped out by a major German offensive. 
After that Sir Douglas Haig maintained a steadfast opposition to a return of the Portuguese 
to the trenches in large units, and by and large he was successful. He could count, as before, 
on the Admiralty to withhold the ships necessary to any significant movement of Portuguese 
troops.1 On 24 April, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour was requested by the War Cabinet 
‘to take the necessary diplomatic action with a view to preventing any further Portuguese 
reinforcements being sent’.2 Long before the Battle of the Lys, however, the British High 
Command had acquired the power to reduce the C.E.P.’s front, choosing not to do so until 
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April 1918. The timing of what followed is difficult to piece together exactly, and at the very 
least it raises serious questions about the High Command’s attitude towards the Portuguese 
soldiers and officers it controlled.
In December 1917, shortly after the C.E.P.’s two divisions had been placed side by side in 
the trenches of Flanders, Sidónio Pais, Portugal’s former Minister in Berlin, seized power 
in Lisbon by force.3 The event naturally provoked concern in the Allied capitals and within 
the C.E.P.4 In Britain, however, this concern was short-lived. General N.W. Barnardiston, 
head of the British Military Mission at Lisbon since 1916, was an early fan of Pais, writing,
A man who could successfully carry out a Revolution for the overthrow of a Government, 
although at the last moment deserted by his affrighted colleagues and feeling sure of the sup-
port of but 250 soldiers, must be a man of strong personality and of great courage animated 
by faith in a high ideal.5
One of the consequences of the Sidónio Pais coup was the agreement reached between 
the two governments on a variant of the so-called Derby Plan, rejected by former Minister 
of War Norton de Matos on 1 October 1917, by which only one division would be kept in 
the trenches. Barnardiston was quick off the mark in alerting London to the possibility that 
Pais might be willing to strike a deal in this regard. It was his estimation that Pais would 
welcome being relieved of the need to maintain a large force in the trenches.6 Barnardiston 
had discussed the situation with Sidónio Pais on 18 December:
I also mentioned that the late War Minister [Norton de Matos] had been approached on 
the subject of certain changes in the organisation of the Portuguese Expeditionary Force in 
France, which, if accepted, might to a great extent relieve the Portuguese Government from 
the necessity of sending such large reinforcements as were at present required, and I spoke of 
the fears of Sir D. Haig for the health and efficiency of the Portuguese troops in the trenches 
during the winter and of the advantage which would accrue if it were agreed that only one 
Division should be kept in line, the other being occupied in training and in furnishing reliefs. 
He seemed rather impressed by this, and promised to consult with the General officers at the 
front on the subject.7
For some days Barnardiston, by now fully aware of the doubts entertained by the British 
High Command regarding the C.E.P.’s suitability for the Western Front, believed he had been 
able to convince Pais to accept the deal in its entirety. He nevertheless informed his superiors 
of the difficulties that still stood in the way of this happening: ‘it would be at once seized 
upon by the Democratic Party and other opponents as evidence of an anti-war and anti-ally 
spirit, an imputation which they are of all things most anxious to avoid’.8 Barnardiston’s 
letter suggests that Pais, eager to see his government recognized by the Allies, was even 
willing to accept the presence of British officers in Portuguese units (not quite to the same 
extent as foreseen in the Derby Plan, but enough to exert ‘an excellent influence’ on the 
conduct of operations). Not for the first time during the war, a Portuguese Government 
was letting it be known informally that it required a formal request from London in order 
to implement a desired policy whose effects on public opinion it feared. This had been the 
case, for example, with the C.E.P.’s very creation, in 1916. Moreover, the letter reveals that 
Barnardiston was in touch with General Gomes da Costa, commander of the Portuguese 
First Division, who came to Portugal at the end of December. Barnardiston was sure that 
this Portuguese officer, well-liked by the British High Command in France, had exercised 
a good influence over Sidónio Pais, given the ‘sane view he takes of the situation’.9
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On 5 January 1918, Barnardiston was instructed to propose formally a version of the 
Derby Plan to the Portuguese Government. The C.E.P. would be left with two divisions, one 
integrated into a British Army Corps and another functioning as a centre for the instruc-
tion of reinforcements and for the recuperation and training of units removed from the 
front. This second division would be led by the C.E.P.’s Commander-in-Chief, to be left in 
charge of discipline among all Portuguese troops in France. In the meantime, and so as 
the strengthen the ‘unity of action’ of the Portuguese and British forces, a British officer of 
rank no higher than captain would be inserted into every battalion or similarly sized unit 
and placed at the disposal of its commander. The Portuguese communiqué would continue 
to exist. Barnardiston was also tasked with trying to convince the Portuguese to abolish 
their Corps H.Q., which in the proposed dispensation would merely complicate the lines 
of command.10
Barnardiston moved quickly, meeting Sidónio Pais the following day and reading out the 
note received from London.11 Later he sent a personal letter, reminding Pais of the ‘glorious 
victories of Roliça, Vimieiro and Bussaco’, won by Portuguese and British troops led by a 
British general, in Portugal itself. That was all Great Britain wanted, be it in France, be it in 
Mozambique.12 Sidónio Pais was obviously more receptive to this kind of appeal than Norton 
de Matos had been. That same day Sir Lancelot Carnegie, British Minister at Lisbon, wrote 
Pais, in the latter’s capacity as Foreign Minister, with a similar proposal.13 On the eighth, 
Barnardiston forwarded Pais’ response on to London. The Portuguese Government was 
willing to accept the principle of unity of command, in order to make the best possible use 
of available resources among the Allies, but only if Portuguese sovereignty was respected.14 
Arthur Lynden-Bell, Director of Staff Duties at the War Office, congratulated Barnardiston – 
‘Barney’ – on his success, since ‘the system now in vogue was bound to come to grief in the 
end and has been the cause of anxiety to everybody’.15 That very day, however, Barnardison 
wrote General Sir R.D. Whigham, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, explaining 
that Pais had disappointingly rowed back on what he had agreed verbally.16 At one stage 
willing to countenance the dissolution of the C.E.P.’s H.Q., he had subsequently concluded 
that this step was politically impossible, wounding as it was to Portuguese pride. There 
remained also some doubts regarding the duties of British officers assigned to Portuguese 
units. Sidónio Pais and Gomes da Costa were, Barnardiston explained, in agreement with the 
British point of view, that is, that in certain circumstances they could assume command – 
but the matter had yet to be decided on. In any case, ‘the experience in France, and the 
late disasters in East Africa have brought the Portuguese to a frame of mind in which they 
are willing to admit their imperfections and are ready to remedy them even at the cost of 
the sacrifice of some “amour propre”’. The British had it in their power, from this moment 
onwards to reduce the C.E.P.’s front to that of a single division, something they had been 
fighting for since the summer. As we shall see, however, they did not follow through with 
this intention, with serious consequences for the C.E.P.’s efficiency and cohesion. The fact 
that the C.E.P. continued to occupy a quiet sector, amidst a British manpower shortage, 
might well have been responsible.17
After Sidónio Pais’ victorious coup, a batch of soldiers left for France aboard a French 
transport vessel. They were destined not for the C.E.P. but rather for the Independent Heavy 
Artillery Corps [Corpo de Artilharia Pesada Independente, C.A.P.I.], a smaller Portuguese 
force designed to operate alongside the French Army.18 The C.E.P. itself had received no rein-
forcements since late summer, and none were programmed. A worried General Tamagnini 
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de Abreu, the C.E.P.’s commander, noted in his diary that some battalions were missing 
between 300 and 400 men; that the C.E.P. was lacking in Infantry and Artillery officers; and 
that there was a shortage of cattle to pull carts and of lorries, with those still in operation 
being now in terrible condition: ‘we are limited to manning the trenches and nothing else’.19 
The lack of reinforcements was clearly beginning to bite. Some days later Tamagnini wrote 
to the Ministry of War, highlighting the difficulties he faced: a shortage of men (some 9000 
in total) and officers; the cumbersome presence in France of soldiers who should never 
have been sent, given their physical inadequacy (2794 so far, many of whom suffered from 
some kind of venereal complaint); the inability to form a reserve of 4000 men, as agreed 
with the British; and the impossibility of giving key units, such as the Sappers, any sort of 
rest.20 Tamagnini was then surprised by a telegram sent on 26 January informing him of 
the government’s resolutions regarding the C.E.P.’s reorganization. He mistakenly believed 
that this had to be the work of Sidónio Pais, since the British had only recently given the 
green light to the presence of the two Portuguese divisions in the trenches side by side, 
under his overall command. Moreover, Tamagnini feared that the withdrawal of a division 
from the front would mean the loss to his command of the C.E.P.’s heavy artillery force, 
then undergoing training in Horsham, in southern England.21 Tamagnini left for Lisbon 
resolved to overturn this decision. Barnardiston, informed of his arrival, as well as that 
of the dismissed Roberto Baptista, the C.E.P.’s very political Chief of Staff (and bête noire 
of the British High Command), wrote to London, ‘I hope there is no intriguing going on 
against the re-organization, but you can never tell here’.22 He need not have worried. Only 
when he met Sidónio Pais did Tamagnini learn that the proposal had really come from 
the British. He immediately offered his to resign, but Sidónio Pais asked him to stay on. 
Sidónio Pais also showed a crestfallen Tamagnini the letters received by Norton de Matos 
from Democratic Party officers in France complaining of Tamagnini’s allegedly pro-Brit-
ish stance. Back in France, Tamagnini ordered two of these officers, Captains Matias de 
Castro and Vitorino Godinho, to return home, as he had lost trust in them; a month later, 
however, they were back in France, ‘because their presence in Portugal was undesirable!!!’23 
Barnardiston, meanwhile, urged London to recognize Sidónio Pais’ government, in order 
to strengthen his political and military hand.
According to a recent biography of Sir Henry Horne, the First Army’s commander 
thought, by late February 1918, that he had done everything possible to secure the defence 
of his sector, identified as a possible target for a major German push. The C.E.P. was his great 
worry. The recent lack of rain, allied to ongoing drainage works, had led to the hardening 
of the soil, making it able to support a rapid infantry advance.24 The First Army’s weekly 
reports show a C.E.P. unwilling to undertake raids against German positions in January 
and February and, as a result, suffering fewer casualties than the other army corps in the 
sector.25 Even so the C.E.P.’s official communiqués reflected the increasing activity in the 
trenches. That of 22 January told of a clash with a ‘strong patrol’ six days earlier, an attack 
carried out by ‘three groups with artillery backing’ on 18 January and intense on-going 
artillery activity; the Portuguese had taken three prisoners and inflicted various losses on 
the enemy, suffering eight killed and 46 wounded, ‘two of which by accident and three due 
to asphyxiating gases’.26 A month later the C.E.P. announced that it had repulsed ‘various 
combat patrols, taking prisoner an officer and two soldiers’; this communiqué mentioned 
also the crash of a Gotha bomber in the Portuguese lines, leading to the capture of the crew.27
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German preparations for a push in the West accelerated, and in March there began ‘the 
most active period undergone’ by the Portuguese at the front.28 For the first time since 
their arrival in France, they now attacked as often as they were attacked. On 2 March a 
raid against Chapigny entered the Portuguese lines, being repelled by a counter-attack. 
On the dawn of 7 March, Infantry 15 repulsed another attack, carried out by 180 men. On 
the night of 9–10, the Portuguese retaliated, with Infantry 21 and a company of Sappers 
conducting a raid on the German lines, ‘carrying out all their objectives, taking prisoners, 
destroying shelters in the second line and blowing up a Decauville [narrow gauge] railway’.29 
According to Humberto de Almeida, seven prisoners were seized, as well as two machine-
guns, while various shelters were destroyed.30 After this attack, Haig sent Tamagnini a 
telegram congratulating him on the operation – a gesture mentioned in the international 
press.31 On the afternoon of 14 March, the German army began an intense bombardment 
of the Portuguese front, including the Laventie, Fauquissart and Chapigny brigade sectors. 
There then occurred a significant raid against the C.E.P.’s right wing, which was repulsed. 
This was followed up by the shelling of its left. The 12th British Division noted that on 
its front, and that of the Portuguese Second Division, the enemy was cutting the wire, in 
order to permit an attack.32 On the nineteenth it was the turn of Infantry 14, again with 
the support of the Sappers, to enter the German lines, destroying shelters and capturing 
men and materiel,33 a feat included in the British communiqué, reproduced around the 
world. A last Portuguese raid was carried out on the night of 2/3 April. During this period 
artillery activity was intense, and the C.E.P.’s increasing exposure to combat, which resulted 
in higher casualties, worried authorities in Lisbon. At the end of March Sidónio Pais asked 
his Minister in London, Augusto de Vasconcelos, to press the British Government to make 
available the ships needed ‘to reinforce as urgently as possible our Expeditionary Corps’.34 
The answer, sent on 6 April, left little room for doubts: it would be possible to secure a 
medical transport for the repatriation of wounded and sick soldiers, but not to bring rein-
forcements to France. All transports were being made available to the United States and 
Canada for the next three months. Vasconcelos lamented that ‘no matter how many times 
we try, we will get nothing’.35
The increased combat efficiency and, in some cases, the aggressive spirit of the C.E.P. did 
not mean that its long-standing organizational defects had finally been overcome. On 14 
March a report by the First Army’s director of medical services, General H.N. Thompson, 
revealed that little had improved in sanitary terms:
On all sides one finds that a total disregard is paid to the elements of sanitation in regard to 
cook-houses, the storage of food, the care of latrines, and surroundings of billets.36
It added that the Portuguese sanitary authorities were aware of the problem, but that they 
were powerless against the behaviour of soldiers and officers alike.37 Overall, though, there 
were signs that the C.E.P. was being considered in a better light by its British overseers. Haig 
visited the Portuguese on 1 March and liked the comparison between what he now saw and 
what he had witnessed a year earlier, even if the absence of leave (available to officers only) 
struck him as dangerous for the soldiers’ morale.38 As has been shown elsewhere, this was 
indeed the great Achilles’ heel of the C.E.P.39 On 20 March Barnardiston wrote Gomes da 
Costa, congratulating him for the C.E.P.’s performance on 2 March. He added,
The last feat of arms gave me real pleasure because it shows that under your training the troops 
have acquired the spirit of the offensive, in consequence of which I am certain that they are 
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now really proud of themselves, full of confidence, and ready at any time to raid the Boche 
trenches again.40
Although there were no reinforcements being sent to the C.E.P. during this period, there 
was intense speculation in Portugal about the force’s future. One issue that was returned to 
again and again in the press was the so-called roulement, which by now had come to mean 
the replacement of soldiers in France by fresh troops. The British dreaded this idea, which 
would require them to once again oversee the training of large numbers of Portuguese 
soldiers arriving in Flanders. According to A Capital, officers and soldiers who had already 
fought in Africa would be the first to be replaced.41 By March, this interventionist newspa-
per was openly stating that the failure to implement a quick roulement was ‘a true crime’.42
The issue of roulement was addressed over the course of six articles in the same newspa-
per’s pages by a C.E.P. officer, Major Cristovão Aires. Aires explained that the impossibility 
of returning home until the war’s end was the cause of ‘indescribable suffering’, although he 
was keen to denounce those who, while in France, had never known danger, keeping well 
away from the trenches. He also blamed the deposed Norton the Matos, whom he called a 
‘sinister dictator’, for the C.E.P.’s failings: ‘the important thing was to force people to embark. 
The rest could be done over there [in France], it could be improvised’.43 In the final article, 
Aires called for what Sidónio Pais had already agreed to, that is, the presence in the trenches 
of a single division, as part of a British army corps. This would be sufficient, he explained, 
to preserve a ‘worthy’ Portuguese representation on the front lines.44 This call might very 
well explain why the articles, which drew Tamagnini’s anger, appeared in the first place.45
Norton de Matos, in exile, reacted to Aires’ articles with a letter to the Lisbon press. The 
C.E.P., he explained, represented the nation and the Army, and he had left arrangements 
in place for reinforcements for both it and the C.A.P.I.: three sailings were programmed 
for December, which would take 3900 men and between 300 and 400 animals to France. 
Barnardiston trusted in these numbers but he added, for Sir Lancelot Carnegie’s benefit,
Now he understands that the Higher Command of the Portuguese Corps is to disappear which 
evidently signifies the disappearance of the Corps. The principal end in view, he says, appears 
to be to avoid having to send reinforcements. The result will be […] that the representation of 
the Nation at the front will disappear and that sooner or later the Portuguese Expeditionary 
Force will disappear too.46
Sidónio Pais reacted to Norton de Matos’ letter by releasing an Official Note accompanied 
by the damning correspondence between Afonso Costa and Norton de Matos, cited in Part 
I of this article, which made clear that the Portuguese army was facing a severe shortage of 
officers suitable for service in France. This would be made use of again when Parliament 
reopened in August, being read out by the Secretary of State for War, Amílcar Mota.47 In 
one telegram, dated 17 May 1917, Afonso Costa reminded Norton, in London, that should 
the latter’s mission fail the government would have to announce its failure and resign. In 
another, dated 10 June, it was Norton de Matos’ turn to write: 
The situation caused by the lack of officers is highly deplorable; we cannot begin fighting and 
the English Ministry of War asks the reason for our desire to constitute an army corps and our 
hurry in shipping more troops when we do not even have enough officers for those already 
in France.
Barnardiston concluded, upon reading these documents, that ‘Senhor Norton de Matos 
and Dr. Afonso Costa must have been well aware that they were attempting more than the 
country could do, and without having been asked to do so’. It is hard to disagree.
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Despite all the doubts entertained by the British High Command in relation to the C.E.P., 
the truth is that the latter’s two divisions withstood the 1917–1918 winter in the trenches. 
As spring approached and the German threat mounted the need for them to remain in their 
place was greater than the desire to see them gone, or even just to implement the agreement 
reached with Sidónio Pais in January. Apprehension among the Portuguese, military and 
civilians alike, grew. Either the corps as a whole should be reinforced or the First Division 
should be withdrawn, allowing its men the rest they so badly needed. But by now this was 
becoming impossible, for the British Expeditionary Force was feeling the effects of a severe 
manpower shortage. In March, Germany launched Operation Michael, aimed at the British 
Third Army, near Cambrai, and the Fifth Army, near the old Somme battlefields. Horne 
had to part with his elite force, the Canadian Corps which had acquired a privileged status 
earlier in the conflict. A week later, the German army launched a new attack – Operation 
Mars – with Arras as an objective, again aimed at the Third Army but also at the southern 
part of Horne’s First Army. For the moment the C.E.P. remained untouched by any major 
operation, but the war’s full fury was edging closer to it. Horne was increasingly concerned 
that his weakened forces would feel the brunt of the next attack. There were two possibil-
ities: a new move towards Arras, from the north-east, or a northwards drive from the La 
Bassée Canal, targeting the dense logistical support network of the British army wedged 
between the front lines and the English Channel, as well as France’s remaining coal mines. 
During the first days of April, it seemed as if Arras was the primary target. In any case the 
strengthening of the First Army for the coming clash was the priority, and this permitted 
casting a fresh eye over the C.E.P. On 8 April Horne wrote his wife,
I am working up back lines because it is prudent to do so. We have no intention of going back 
unless compelled to by finding our flank turned! There are anxious times as during this lull 
the Boche must be preparing a fresh attack and a heavy one and I think it may extend south-
wards from the La Bassée Canal at this time, with perhaps a small attack north of the Canal.48
Even if only as a diversion, it seemed certain that the front lines held by XI Corps, recently 
returned from Italy, and the C.E.P. would be targeted. The time had come to implement, at 
long last, the Derby Plan in its revised January 1918 form. Most of the First Division was 
removed from the battlefield, leaving a reinforced Second Division to hold the whole of the 
Portuguese front, as part of XI Corps. General Sir Richard Haking, once again responsible 
for the C.E.P. in the front lines, was quick to order the Second Division’s withdrawal as 
well. The move was scheduled for the night of 9/10 April. Horne would later be accused 
of moving too slowly to remove the whole of the C.E.P. as part of his preparations for the 
coming onslaught. Basil Liddell Hart would write, ‘We might aptly coin the phrase “First 
Army Aid” as a satirical definition for misguided first aid’.49 This suggests that the fate that 
befell the C.E.P. on 9 April was the result of unfortunate timing, or British bureaucratic 
bungling. But matters are not so simple.
In November 1917, before he and XI Corps Staff left for Italy, Haking, through a secret 
order, had put in place a defensive plan which, he insisted, could not be shared with the 
Portuguese. In essence, the plan was a way of minimizing the danger which might result 
from the C.E.P.’s precipitate withdrawal in the face of a German attack. Should such an 
attack develop, each XI Corps unit would send immediately a battalion to secure a line to 
the rear of the Portuguese. Senior, Haking’s biographer, writes,
Here, then, was official recognition that Haking, and indeed the hierarchy of the British Army, 
had finally given up on the Portuguese. While they were habitually referred to as Britain’s 
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‘time honoured allies’, the average Tommy simply and disparagingly called them ‘the Pork and 
Beans’ or ‘the Geese’. A century earlier, Wellington had described his Portuguese troops in the 
Peninsula as the ‘Fighting Cocks’ of his army, but in the First World War they were soldiers 
lacking in spirit, discipline and leadership.50
This is confirmed by the official British history of the war. Sir James E. Edmonds notes 
that on 3 December 1917 Haig asked his subordinates what steps might be taken in relation 
to the defence of their respective sectors. Horne answered that the C.E.P. was in no shape 
to resist a German attack. As a result of this,
The front of the Corps was then shortened, its northern brigade sector (Fleurbaix) being, on 
the 20th December, taken over by the XV Corps, and it was arranged in the defence scheme 
that the line of the Lawe and the Lys behind the Portuguese would be held by British troops.51
Also according to Edmonds, Jan Smuts then toured the British front, pointing to the 
Portuguese sector, on his return to London, as a weak point in the line. Questioned by Sir 
William Robertson, still the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, on the matter, Haig replied 
that a German attack would result in the capture of part, if not the whole, of the C.E.P.’s 
sector. That is why a protective pocket would immediately be prepared, with the divisions 
to the north and south deploying a line to protect their flank, linking up with the troops 
marching up from the rear to the natural line of defence provided by the rivers Lawe and 
Lys. As winter turned to spring, concern grew among the British High Command, as we 
have seen, because an unusual lack of rain was making the ground harder, and therefore 
easier for attacking troops to traverse: but still the High Command kept the C.E.P. in place.
Haking and his XI Corps staff returned from Italy on 15 March 1918. Three days later, 
according to Edmonds, the CEP’s reorganization began, only to be put back to 5 April 
owing to the lack of available replacements. On the appointed day most of the First Division 
withdrew, leaving the entire Portuguese sector protected by three brigades in the trenches 
and one in reserve. They were supported by the whole of the C.E.P.’s artillery, which stayed 
in place. A stretch of the front line hitherto defended by four brigades was now defended 
by three. On 25 March, with this coming reorganization firmly in mind, Haking had met 
with the commanders of the 55th Division, XI Corps’ other formation in the front lines. No 
Portuguese were present as Haking went over the preparations for the defence of his sector. 
He explained that at that precise moment it was not thought probable that First Army would 
be targeted for a major push by the German army, which did not mean that vigilance was 
unnecessary. Still, Haking reiterated his philosophy:
If we have any idea of holding our front and holding our back systems at the same time with 
our limited number of troops, we shall have insufficient to hold either and shall run the risk 
of being beaten piecemeal.52
In other words, Haking was discounting the increasingly popular idea of defence in-depth – 
an idea defended by his own superior, Horne and, until then, instilled into the Army’s 
divisions, the Portuguese included. According to Haking, defence in-depth made sense only 
when there were enough troops to implement it; but when there was a shortage of men, 
as was now the case, it was imperative to choose one line and to make every effort to hold 
it. Haking insisted that the 55th Division’s ‘line of resistance’ should be held at all costs. It 
remained for the divisional commander to decide where this line should be drawn, but he 
should keep in mind that the further to the rear it was established, the bigger the gap between 
it and the C.E.P.’s own line of resistance – and this because Haking had assigned the so-called 
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B line to the C.E.P. as its line of resistance, where it must hold at all costs, and where its 
reserve brigade would also deploy in case of attack. The 55th Division’s commanders opted 
for the so-called Village Line as its ‘line of resistance’; this consisted of a series of concrete 
strongpoints whose firepower could be fully employed only once the B line had been lost. 
As a result, the A and B lines would be lightly manned only. Haking then instructed the 
55th Division on how to respond if the enemy broke through to the north, that is, through 
the C.E.P.’s lines: it was to establish a defensive flank running perpendicular to its line of 
defence. This would be mirrored by a similar action to be undertaken by the 40th Division 
(part of XV Corps), to the North of the Portuguese, thus establishing the protective pocket 
around the Portuguese sector. It remained necessary to coordinate the defence of the sector 
with the Portuguese. Haking explained that
He was meeting the G.O.C. Portuguese Corps in the afternoon and he would tell them that 
the XI Corps would join with the Portuguese Corps at INDIAN VILLAGE, and that it would 
be necessary to connect INDIAN VILLAGE and CAILLOUX Post with a trench. He was also 
going to tell the Portuguese Commanders that they must hold and fight in their front system 
of defence, and that their main line of resistance would be the B Line.
Why this difference of criteria? Why were the Portuguese instructed to defend en masse 
an advanced line, being exposed to an outflanking manoeuvre, when the neighbouring 
British division was being given the freedom to decide which line it would hold? According 
to Haking, for two basic reasons. Firstly, the wire defences in front of their B Line were in 
good condition, which was not the case in the 55th Division’s sector, at a time when a great 
shortage of wire was being experienced. Secondly, the loss of Neuve Chapelle would generate 
a crisis of morale (presumably among the British who had fought for it in the past), the 
Portuguese being therefore obliged to defend it. It is very difficult to establish the veracity 
of these claims, which at the very least seem to contradict the accusation regularly levelled 
against the C.E.P. that it was incapable of looking after its sector’s defensive apparatus. In 
any case, the C.E.P.’s fate was being sealed without its leaders being present. What happened 
in its front did not really matter, this arrangement seems to suggest, since the real battle 
would be fought elsewhere, on the river line, or the Village Line immediately in front of it, 
to be defended by Haking’s other troops, whose numbers were now growing.
On 5 April, the First Portuguese Division was withdrawn from the trenches and sent to 
Ambleteuse to rest, the Second Division being entrusted to Gomes da Costa and formally 
transferred to XI Corps. The Portuguese General, ‘a very capable soldier’, in Edmonds’ 
estimation, was then informed that the front line would remain as before, although he need 
not worry about a dispersal of forces, since he would only have to man the front lines.53 
The rest of the sector, including the lines to the rear, would be defended by XI Corps’ 
remaining units, starting with the First King Edward’s Horse Regiment and the XI Corps 
cyclists. While the 55th Division, to the south, defended 4000 yards with nine battalions, 
the Second Portuguese Division covered 10,000 yards with sixteen,54 and these were missing 
large numbers of men and officers.55
One is entitled to ask what the British High Command expected from Gomes da Costa 
and his men, given their vulnerable position and their evident weakness. While on the one 
hand it distrusted the Portuguese army’s ability to hold on in the face of a German attack, 
on the other it seemed to assign the C.E.P. a pointless mission, manning an indefensible 
line that would count for little in the ultimate course of the battle. Were the Portuguese 
simply the lure for German forces to rush into a trap, with the hopefully impassable river 
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and village lines blocking their advance and flanking fire from the 55th and 40th Divisions 
to the south and north cutting them down? Was the C.E.P. being deliberately sacrificed 
by Haking? Had nothing else happened until the 9 April battle this argument might seem 
convincing. But on the morning of 8 April, a conference took place among the heads of the 
First and Third Armies and of XI and XV Corps. Haking explained that the C.E.P.’s solid 
performances during the March raids had not convinced him of its effectiveness. A better 
indicator of its current mood and ultimate potential was the recent mutiny in the Infantry 
7 battalion (whose men on 4 April had refused an order to return to the front lines), taken 
as a sign that the C.E.P.’s soldiers had reached the end of their tether. If subjected to a con-
certed attack, Haking said, the Portuguese would run.56 As a result it was decided at this 
meeting to remove the Second Division from the front line as quickly as possible, replacing 
it in the trenches by brigades belonging to the 50th and 55th Divisions, the former being 
transferred to XI Corps. These brigades would take over from the Portuguese on the night 
of 9/10 April. On the evening of 8 April, Second Division was informed that it had only 
one more day left in the trenches. A history of the 55th Division published immediately 
after the war’s end refers a visit by a Portuguese brigade commander to the headquarters 
of the 166th Brigade – at that moment the 55th Division’s reserve force – for purposes of 
arranging the handover: ‘everything was in order for the relief to take place the following 
day’.57 It should be noted that, the 55th Division aside, the other large British formations 
in this sector, including the 40th Division, had recently arrived from the battlefields fur-
ther to the south, in search of a quiet spell; they were trying to integrate a large number of 
replacement troops to make up for the recently suffered losses.
Had the German offensive been launched a day later, on 10 April, it would have met 
British forces in the trenches until then held by the Portuguese. It is impossible to say how 
exactly they would have been dispersed over the battlefield. Would they have been con-
centrated on the B Line, as the Portuguese were? Or would they leave only a covering force 
at the front, like the 55th Division to the south, holding a stronger line to the rear? This 
option seems unlikely, given the disposition of the Portuguese artillery behind the B Line, 
requiring adequate protection. In the meantime, in Lisbon, Sidónio Pais met again with 
Barnardiston to inform him that he was ready to send 5000 soldiers to France, but that the 
ships at his disposal could take no more than 700 per month, and no horses. There were 
also health-related restrictions preventing the arrival of Portuguese soldiers in France.58
A work recently published in Portugal casts doubt on the British High Command’s 
intentions. According to Antonio José Telo and Pedro Marquês de Sousa, whose important 
book is unfortunately marked by patchy notation, by 5 April the British were generally 
convinced that the coming German offensive would be delivered against the C.E.P. By 8 
April, they were almost certain of this.59 The two authors detail a meeting between Haig and 
Horne at which the former unequivocally stated that the following day a major offensive 
would be launched against XI Corps, as a result of which Haig passed this intelligence on 
to Foch, asking for available reserves to be sent to the Lys sector. Moreover, according to 
the same authors, orders were given to the British units destined to defend the river line to 
start moving towards their assigned positions, while the 40th and 55th Divisions were told 
to start their flanking operations, preparing Haking’s pocket. The implication is clear: the 
Portuguese were the last to know what was really happening, and the forces they believed 
would relieve them on 10 April would never move beyond the real line of defence, well 
behind the C.E.P.’s own ‘line of resistance’. On 6 April Haking called on Gomes da Costa at 
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the latter’s H.Q., in Lestrem, in order to impress on Gomes da Costa what the CEP should 
do in case of attack: hold the B Line, while further back the Village Line would be manned 
by the British.60 Gomes da Costa asked only for some of the First Division’s officers to be 
transferred to the Second, Haking agreeing to put the request directly to Tamagnini.
Quoting from Tamagnini’s diary entry for 7 April, Telo and Marquês de Sousa note 
that Haking, faced by Tamagnini’s refusal to release the officers in question, replied that 
these ‘were needed to resist the “Boche attack that is expected tomorrow or very soon”’.61 
Tamagnini refused to release the officers, but the authors note that
This is the only reference we find regarding a British warning about 9 April. The warning was 
given by Haking during a heated argument with Fernando Tamagnini, at a moment when the 
latter no longer has any operational responsibility. The C.E.P.’s commander (he still held the 
role, despite the lack of operational responsibility) attributed no importance to what he heard, 
despite noting it in his diary. He must have considered it merely an imaginary argument to 
try to convince him to release the officers, as a result of which he did not pass it on to Gomes 
da Costa. The two Portuguese generals had severed all contact, so that Haking had to pass 
on one’s requests to the other. This might seem a scene from an Italian opera, but it was the 
C.E.P.’s reality days before 9 April!62
According to Vasco de Carvalho, on 7 April Gomes da Costa and his staff were once again 
visited by Haking, the latter praising their spirit of sacrifice and insisting on his previous 
orders: the C.E.P., it seemed, was going nowhere for the moment.63 But what he heard at 
that meeting about the C.E.P.’s faltering morale must have impressed him, since, as we have 
seen, Haking met with his own superiors on 8 April, as a result of which the order was given 
to withdraw the Second Portuguese Division from the front line immediately.
Telo and Marquês de Sousa argue that there is a contradiction between this withdrawal 
order and the absolute near certainty of a German attack on 9 April. They suggest two 
possible explanations for what happened next. The first is that the withdrawal order was 
just a way of moving British troops to the Lys and the Lawe, which they were to defend 
on 9 April, without arousing suspicion, the Portuguese being deliberately left unawares of 
what was happening. The second is that bad luck struck, Haking being unable to remove 
the Portuguese from the scene before the launch of the German offensive.64 Although they 
suggest that the truth might fall somewhere in between, the general thrust of their work 
tends towards the first option, that of a cynical sacrifice. They write, ‘there can be no doubt 
that there was a cold British calculation in the execution of what was, it should be said, their 
defensive plan, right from the start’. The order for the Second Division’s withdrawal and 
substitution allowed the British to place their units in the ideal location to halt the German 
advance, while the Portuguese absorbed the fatal first blow.
The argument advanced by the two Portuguese historians stands or falls with the assess-
ment that Haking and Horne knew beyond any doubt that the German attack would be 
delivered on 9 April. This is not as clear-cut as they suggest. According to General Brind, of 
XI Corps Staff, it was only on 8 April that aerial reconnaissance made it clear that an attack 
was imminent.65 J.E. Edmonds states that the lack of German artillery activity that day 
worried Haking, who told his Artillery chief, Brigadier-General Metcalfe, that he feared that 
the Germans would attack precisely as the Portuguese withdrew.66 And when the artillery 
barrage began on the morning of 9 April, there was considerable confusion among British 
and Portuguese alike over what precisely it heralded.67 All of this suggests that it was only on 
the eve of battle that Haking realized an attack was definitely coming – but even then there 
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was no absolute certainty as to the day. The Portuguese spent the better part of the night 
of 8–9 April preparing their move out of the trenches. Officers updated archives and maps 
while soldiers stowed away arms and munitions – preparations which actually hindered 
them the following day. Spirits were high. Gomes da Costa was up until 3 am preparing for 
his departure.68 Had Haking been sure that an attack was coming before the Portuguese 
left the trenches, he would surely have told them to prepare for it, instead of making them 
take steps that made their task even more difficult.
In a wider sense, however, the fate of the Portuguese at the Battle of the Lys had been 
sealed well before April 1918. It was sealed when the British Admiralty cut off their supply 
of reinforcements; when the C.E.P. was transformed into a full army corps, its divisions 
placed side by side in the trenches; when Sidónio Pais took power in Lisbon, casting out the 
interventionist leadership; when soldiers were denied the leave that their officers availed of; 
and when many of these officers did not return to France, having secured a safe administra-
tive position at home. Recriminations would follow the Battle of the Lys, which effectively 
brought the C.E.P.’s existence as a fighting unit to an end. The Portuguese were scapegoated 
by the British High Command and subsequent historiography for the difficulties experi-
enced early in the battle. However, their performance on the day cannot have come as a 
surprise to anyone acquainted with the difficulties experienced by them in France, not all 
of which were of their making.
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